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Abstract 
 
Law’s regulation of transboundary hydropower dams is a field of study brimming 
with paradoxes. The most notable being the paradox of a hydropower dam solving 
one problem and creating another. From a logical perspective, such a paradox would 
typically be viewed as an obstacle to be avoided because it brings everything to a 
standstill. But from a social perspective, paradoxes are not neces- sarily negative, as 
managing them also potentially enlightens and transforms planning systems. The 
latter perspective, which brings to analysis a kind of dyna- mism, is employed in this 
text. In order to work out the reoccurring patterns under which law might 
productively make use of paradoxes, this text therefore proposes the methodological 
tools of exposing and building upon paradoxes. Exposing paradoxes sets out to make 
more visible some of the unthought limitations, self- deceptions and self-
contradictions which arise in modern planning practices, while building upon 
paradoxes attempts to open up headways towards a more adequate conceptualisation 
of the solutions which law can offer. The overall intention here being to offer a 
Luhmannian-inspired theoretical framework which illuminates the value of social 
systems theory as a methodological tool for describing the com- municative 
challenges facing law’s regulation of transboundary hydropower power dams. 
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Introduction 
 
Imagine a situation where a lawyer uses particular distinctions
1 
like lawful and 
unlawful, or a scientist investigating whether certain empirical findings are true or 
false, or an economist calculating whether or not monetary profit can be made. Now 
think of the time when these specialists are forced to make a decision to select A 
over B, despite being unable to meet a reasonable standard of rationality because they 
do not have full information. This we may call a paradox. In the context of 
transboundary hydropower regulation, paradoxes are abundant, especially as these 
projects tend to solve one problem but also create another. For example, think of the 
efficiency paradox, whereby the industrialisation of a river increases irrigation 
efficiency to save water, only for the saved water to be used for the expansion of the 
irrigation area and thus no net savings of water are made. Or think of the peak water 
paradox, whereby increasing water extraction upstream leads to potential environ- 
mental degradation downstream, as was the case in the Murrumbidgee basin, 
Australia (Sivapalan and Blo¨ schl 2015). 
From a logical perspective, such paradoxes would typically be viewed as obstacles 
to be avoided because they bring everything to a standstill. But from a social 
perspective, paradoxes are not necessarily negative, as managing them also 
potentially enlightens and transforms planning systems.
2 
The latter perspective, 
which provides analysis with a kind of dynamism, is employed in this text. In order 
to work out the reoccurring patterns under which law might productively make use 
of paradoxes, this text therefore proposes the methodological tools of exposing and 
building upon paradoxes. Exposing paradoxes sets out to make more visible some of 
the unthought limitations, self-deceptions and self-contradictions which arise in 
modern planning practices, while building upon paradoxes attempts to open up 
headways towards a more adequate conceptualisation of the solutions which law can 
offer. The overall intention here being to offer a Luhmannian-inspired theoretical 
framework which illuminates the value of social systems theory as a methodological 
tool for describing the communicative challenges facing law’s regulation of 
transboundary hydropower power dams. 
This text first briefly explores the theoretical background to Luhmann’s social 
systems theory, focusing in particular on the question of how paradoxes arise within 
the operations of social systems (‘Exposing the Paradoxes of Social Systems’ 
section). The text will then explore the communicative challenges facing law when 
it aspires to offer planning systems support to build upon paradoxes, that is, to look 
for and compare alternative ways of solving problems. This will be conceptualised 
by providing a brief overview of the proposed theoretical framework (‘Building Upon 
Paradoxes Via Methodology’ section), followed by the framework’s main body 
(‘Making Use of Paradoxes Via Theoretical Framework’ section), with conclusions 
reached in the last section. 
 
1   Distinction, understood here as pointing to things that matter. 
2   Planning systems are understood here not as a system of people labelled ‘planners’, or of a system of 
state organisations called ‘planning departments’. It refers to a constellation of coupled organisations 
which observe each other, and respond to each other, in terms of their decision-making processes. 
  
 
Exposing the Paradoxes  of Social Systems 
 
How might one adequately comprehend the complex ‘hydro-socio-ecological 
connections’ (Bond 2012, p. 197) underpinning law’s regulation of hydropower 
dams? I propose roughly two distincWt methodological approaches. The first is to 
employ the perspective of a participant observer, such as a jurist or a practitioner, 
whereby the predominate interest here is to participate in decision-making processes 
so as to offer planning systems’ support and practical guidance. Are state X’s planned 
measures lawful or unlawful, right or wrong, economically feasible or not, being some 
of the frequent questions asked. Of course, there is no doubt these advisory 
transactions play a crucial role in ensuring that planning systems run smoothly. But 
what happens when the question of paradoxes enters the equation, and the 
probability of being criticised for making inadequate judgements increases? 
Perhaps the more pressing issue in these circumstances is to understand better the 
present condition, by asking the more preliminary question ‘how can one improve 
observations’, as opposed to jumping ahead and asking ‘what can be done’. This is 
where the analytical value of the second methodological approach can be found, the 
systemic observer which this text proposes. What differentiates a systemic observer 
from a participant observer is that whereas the latter is concerned primarily with the 
observational question of what, the former is concerned primarily with the how; this 
being, namely, how and why is it that participant observers observe (or do not 
observe) certain problems as problems, or certain solutions as solutions? It is, in 
other words, concerned with working out the forces that lie behind a participant 
observer’s ability to have reached their current assessment of the events. Of course, 
such cool detachment from the hurly-burly world of decision-making processes 
means that this type of analysis cannot itself offer any useful technical professional 
advice. But what it can do is offer a ‘semantic reorganization of knowledge’ 
(Luhmann 2013, p. 20) so as to reach a proper formulation of the proposed research 
agenda, to work out the reoccurring patterns under which law might productively 
make use of paradoxes. 
In order to adequately address this question, it is necessary first to employ an 
empirically sound and logical basis with which to ground the analysis. Drawing 
upon the works of Niklas Luhmann’s theory of society, I propose that this can be 
most adequately attained by focusing the analysis at the level of social systems.
3
 
After all, if the analysis were to account for the (roughly speaking) 7 billion 
individuals living on this planet, it would likely be drowned with informational 
overload. But if the analysis employs a fictional distinction where one finds a set of 
clearly differentiated and typified functional (social) systems such as law, science 
and the economy, then this offers a more comfortable basis for analysis. For what this 
enables is an exploration of how each functional system strives to do nothing more 
than autopoietically
4  
reproduce themselves. A functional system such as the 
 
3   To the question of what is meant by social systems, Luhmann simply claims that ‘there are systems’ 
and these are empirically observable: if conversations, payments or organisations are real, then also social 
systems are real (Luhmann 1995, p. 12). 
4   The  concept  autopoiesis derives from the  Greek whereby autos  means ‘self’ and poiesis means 
‘production’, hence the concept literally means ‘self-production’. 
  
 
law,  for  example,  ‘produces  and  connects millions  of  courts,  lawyers,  judges, 
clients, and cases to one another in and through an ever reproducing network of 
communications’ (Kessler 2009, p. 102). Indeed, it is only by doing this, that the 
legal system
5  
can build its own communicational redundancies (i.e. its routines, 
repetitive communications or past decisions) and thus distinguish itself from other 
types of communications—a prerequisite for the survival of any social system. 
But why then select social systems as the basis for analysis, and not natural features  
such  as  the  river  basin  system?  This  is  because,  from  a  systemic perspective, 
the latter does not exist as a system. Although we could, for example, describe the 
downhill gravitational natural flow of a river as systemic, this is not the case if we 
understand the preconditions to any system as having only autopoietic self-referential 
features. For whereas an autopoietic social system has the ability to pull itself up from 
its own bootstraps and establish boundaries that distinguish itself from its 
environment
6 
(environment understood here as everything else surrounding a system 
and not just the natural environment), the river basin system, by contrast, cannot. 
What goes into a river cannot be taken out by the river itself, but if a social system is 
disrupted, such as the way of life of an indigenous tribe, this system can at the least 
protest, as was the case of the Xingu River tribal people in Brazil. 
In this Luhmannian perspective, excluding natural features such as a river from 
the analysis is, therefore, the only way in which a systemic observer can take a river 
seriously. For what this analytical positioning acknowledges is that a river remains 
excluded from society and hence is marginalised, and that the only way it can become 
relevant is if it is incorporated into social communication.
7 
The same is true for 
individual humans, because even if a fist is secretly shaken in one’s pocket, this only 
becomes relevant if such action is communicated. This is why Luhmann’s 
‘world society’ constitutes the horizon of all possible communications, because it is 
social systems that utilise communications to autopoietically reproduce themselves, 
rather than ecological conditions or individual humans which make society happen.
8
 
Ecological conditions, nevertheless, may allow for the enactment of social 
communication, and human individuals may contribute to communication through 
 
5   More specifically, the ‘legal system’ is understood here as the total sum of all communications within 
society that are directly related to issues of legality or illegality. It extends, for example, to government 
departments debating the creation of new laws and regulations, to the teaching and interpretation of legal 
norms in law schools, or to environmental NGOs investigating cases of transboundary water pollution with 
a view to possible court action. At the same time, all other systemic communications, such as politics, 
religion or economy and so forth, form part of the environment of the legal system, namely whatever 
the system is not. 
6   See Maturana and Varela (1987, pp. 46, 47). 
7   Following Luhmann, social communication means the occurrence whenever information is announced 
by A and understood by B. Here understood refers to the likelihood that B misunderstands the information, 
without understanding that it misunderstands the information. In other words, communi- cation does not 
refer to a substantial transfer of information from sender to receiver but, rather, it refers to the likelihood 
that communication emerges ‘unintentionally’; see Moeller (2005, p. 217). 
8   More specifically, as Ziegert puts it explaining Luhmann’s unequivocally clear and uncompromising 
position, this is because: ‘people (individuals) think, social systems communicate; conversely, systems 
cannot and do not think and individuals have no control over the meaning(s) that are produced by systems’ 
(2013, p. 324). Or, in the words of King, simplified but still in keeping with the proposition of systems 
theory: ‘systems, not people, make society happen’ (King 2009). 
  
 
consciousness, but these entities will always remain part of the environment of a 
social system (Luhmann 2012). 
This is where the paradox of social systems can be found. Since the environment 
(including all other systems) represents everything else surrounding a system, and 
since the environment is always more complex than the system, the environment 
therefore presents for the system an ‘ungraspable unity’ (Luhmann 1995, p. 209). As a 
consequence, the environment remains inaccessible to the system, because a system 
can never actually communicate with its environment, but only about its 
environment. Should a system proceed to communicate about its external 
environment,  then  this  is  always  an  internally  constructed  vision  based  on  a 
system’s own specific redundancies. Luhmann describes this autopoietic process as 
the evolutionary achievements of functional differentiation, whereby human 
communication achieves a certain scale and begins to branch out into separate realms 
(e.g. science, economics or politics). As a means for discovery rather than an end in 
itself, he also suggests each functional system employs a binary code with which it 
uses to see and interpret the world. For example, in order to function, science uses 
the code true/false and its derivatives, such as subjective/objective or likely/unlikely. 
Although actual truths change all the time, science, however, can only approach the 
world through these codes. It cannot use true/false/feminist, for example, or 
subjective/objective/subaltern unless it turns into ideology (Fuchs 1999, p. 118). 
Similar arguments can be made for other functional systems, such as the economic 
system, whereby its transactional possibilities are structured by the code 
payment/non-payment (i.e. wealth creation) and not social position; or the political 
system, which strives for independence from religion by structuring itself around the 
code  government/opposition, so  as  to  retain  its  capacity  to  make  collectively 
binding decisions. 
If one accepts this Luhmannian description of society, then this explains why 
society  appears  differently  even  though  it  remains  the  same.  It  explains,  for 
example, why a banker, restricted and burdened by the demands of the economic 
system, might observe hydropower infrastructure investment in terms of payments, 
while a politician might observe this as a means to reinforce legitimacy. Nonetheless, 
this intense sensibility to specific questions also explains why modern society 
becomes a threat to itself, as it tends to give way to a recurrent stream of paradoxes 
or, as Luhmann puts it, that when ‘one acts as society expects one to act, one acts 
poorly’ (Luhmann 1999, cited in Alexander and Blum 2016, p. 244). For example, 
the paradox of enhanced economic predicaments driven by ongoing power games of 
political actors or the profit-oriented calculations of lobbyist, often come 
‘at the cost of ecological and social sustainability’.9 Of course this is not to say that 
paradoxes will bring everything to a standstill, but what it does point to is that each 
system will have to handle and build upon paradoxes in their own particular ways, 
something which law seeks to facilitate, as will be explored next. 
 
 
 
 
 
9   Valentinov describes this paradox as the complexity sustainability trade-off; see Valentinov (2014). 
  
 
Building Upon Paradoxes  Via Methodology 
 
The concept ‘to build upon paradoxes’ does not mean to try and resolve problems. 
After all, the core problems facing law’s regulation of transboundary hydropower 
dams have, more or less, been resolved long ago.
10  
Instead, the concept invites 
analysis to explore the conditions under which planning systems might look for and 
compare alternative ways of solving problems. For example, when observing the 
solutions available for flood control, a planning system may traditionally employ the 
formulas of efficiency from the economic system that building one large dam as 
opposed to several smaller dams is the most cost-effective means.
11  
However, in a 
functional differentiated society this has to be negotiated, since each functional 
system offers solutions (or formulaic templates) to different problems. The formulas 
of risk minimisation from the system of science, for example, might diagnose that 
there are other functional equivalents to flood control, such as modifying land use 
within the flood-plain so that flood-waters can be accommodated, or by building an 
alternative number of smaller dams upstream with floodplain management 
downstream.
12  
In this sense, using the above examples, if we accept that the economic 
system offers solutions to different problems than science, then this functional 
analysis offers roughly two important insights. On the one hand, it invites analysis  to  
compare  the  artificiality of  how  problem-solution relationships are rooted in the 
need for the survival of each system (i.e. the exposure of paradoxes). On the other 
hand, it also enables analysis to gain new insights about the particular solutions being 
compared by planning systems (i.e. the analysis of building upon paradoxes). 
To illustrate these dual processes, the proposed theoretical framework will employ 
a fictional scenario. Set within the context of a joint transboundary hydropower 
project between two nation states,
13   
the overall intention here is to work out the 
reoccurring patterns under which law might productively expose and build upon 
paradoxes, that is, to make use of paradoxes. To do so, the following autopoietic  
processes  of  self-reference,  paradox,  indeterminacy,  and  stability through 
eigenvalues
14  
will be employed.
15  
Self-reference
16  
explores how recurring 
 
10   For example, Rieu-Clarke summarises six institutional linkages relvant to transboundary hydropower 
dams which intersect between legal regimes (2015). I explore this in more detail in the ‘‘Stability Through 
Eigenvalues’’ section. 
11   As supported by Howe and Dixon who observe that for development banks large projects hold the 
promise of concrete and large-scale changes, maximising aid flow while minimising project management 
costs (1993). 
12   As suggested typically by proponents of ‘sustainability science’. See for example, Swart et al. (2004). 
13   More specifically the nation state is understood in this text as a political organisational system whose 
function is the ‘production of attributability and visibility of the collectivity’ (Nassehi 2002, p. 245). 
14   A classic illustration of an eigenvalue from auto-logic used by Teubner is: ‘This sentence has ?? 
letters’. The number thirty-one is one eigenvalue of this sentence (2011, p. 388). 
15   These four elements are adapted from the autopoiesis literature which Gunther Teubner proposes 
offers ‘practical solutions to the indeterminacy problem’ (2011, p. 387). 
16   Self-reference, meaning what can be detected and processed as information at any time, depends upon 
the legal system’s stream of accompanying redundancies (i.e. its routines, repetitive communications or 
past decisions). 
  
 
patterns of communications within the  legal  system self-organise in  a manner, 
which often burdens the law with the task of institutionalising irresolvable conflicts. 
Paradox explores how legal argumentation serves to subject communications to 
highly selective actualisations of the future. Indeterminacy explores how events, no 
matter what actually happens, will happen many times depending on a social system’s 
scope of analysis. Finally, stability through eigenvalues explores the manner in which 
law’s institutional norms offer planning systems’ support and stability to continue 
their autopoiesis. 
The value of this theoretical framework, I propose, can be found in the way it 
emphasises the immediacy of the law’s autopoiesis. In other words, how the 
appearance of problems also initiates processes for solutions, and how this in turn 
produces consequent problems/solutions. This has the advantage of enabling analysis 
to define problems more specifically, and in doing so subsequently enhances the 
number of possible solutions to practical problems which could be understood as 
problems outside the legal system. Indeed, although employing this four-step 
autopoietic process will inevitably place a degree of restlessness upon the analysis,
17  
I propose this has productive value, since it presses analysis to probe further, to 
inquire more deeply into the intricacies of paradoxes, while simultane- ously offering 
methodological tools which are ‘more freewheeling than liberal universalism and 
more systematic than poststructuralism’ (Kim 2015, p. 374). 
 
 
Making  Use of Paradoxes  Via Theoretical Framework 
 
Self-Reference 
 
When disbelief or suspicion is systematically suspended, a social system emerges 
(Luhmann 1995). When a social system organises communications so that 
expectations constrain a range of possibilities (i.e. science allocates truth/false 
values), structures are created. When structures are created, communications and 
complex technological sectors such as hydropower infrastructure become routinely 
co-ordinated with each other, to the extent that planning systems proceed on the 
assumption that the basic fundamentals of hydropower technology works. 
The feasibility of engendering these structural presuppositions nevertheless 
produces a paradoxical requirement for law. On the one hand, the legal system 
consequently becomes burdened with the task of naturalisation: it is expected to 
strengthen the discourse that the operations of a hydropower dam will not cause 
significant harm to other riparian states (or other systems) despite legally permitted 
invariable changes in water flows.
18 
Of course, this is in itself a paradoxical 
requirement, for even if planning systems implement further control mechanism, 
 
17   In the sense that the theoretical framework invites the analysis to cast new lights on social practices, 
but at the same time never claim a privileged standpoint from which to speak ‘the truth’ about particular 
problems and solutions. 
18   As designated in the principle of equitable utilisation which determines the right of a state to use the 
waters of an international watercourse. This is also reflected in the principle of limited territorial 
sovereignty. See e.g. Magsig (2011, p. 335). 
  
 
such as the modification of rules, habits and arguments, these are still subject to the 
same paradoxical requirements: the duty not to cause significant harm, despite 
invariable changes produced by a hydropower dam’s ‘factory time’.19  As a result, 
due to this regulatory burden of having to present the law’s inconsistency as 
consistency,
20  
paradoxes will therefore inevitably be generated, no matter how far the 
law succeeds in strengthening the discourses that the operations of a hydropower dam 
works, as opposed to it not working. 
On the other hand, law also becomes burdened with the task of institutionalising 
policies, laws and plans. Of particular relevance is the story of how law is expected 
to regulate the asymmetries of switching off and switching on the operations of a 
hydropower dam, from uncontrollable water flows to the opportunity of controlling 
such flows. The asymmetry here refers to the specific character of switching off the 
hydropower  dam,  where  the   simple  solution  of   withdrawing  technological 
resources, as opposed to leaving it on, results in even more catastrophic costs 
including the risk of unmitigated flooding, the risks of insufficient energy supplies, 
or the risk of unprecedented liability issues (Hepler 2006). This is especially the 
case where urban development on vulnerable floodplains becomes more and more 
dependent upon the ‘factory time’ of evermore functional hydropower dams. In 
other words, the more planning systems depend upon technological resources to 
avert ecological disasters, the more society develops its own structures on the basis 
of this precondition—until something unexpected occurs. 
Afterwards everything is different; afterwards it was human error; afterwards the 
environmental parlance is drawn between destroyers of the environment (the 
industrialists), and environmental conservationists (the supporters of ecological 
interests). The paradox of conflicting values can be more or less summarised in the 
difference of semantics. For the industrialist, the semantics of integration are typically 
chosen as the political solution to the conflict. The idea here is to maintain the 
presentation of all-inclusiveness: to ensure the realisation of the right to develop, and 
thus relieve society from the worry of economic stagnation, inadequate water supply 
and unmitigated flooding, hydropower infrastructure development is therefore a 
necessity. In contrast, the environmentalist employs the semantics of inclusion and 
exclusion: the industrialist celebrates all-inclusiveness, yet this produces mass 
exclusion through the displacement of peoples, water quality degradation and/or the 
destruction of wetlands and fishing grounds. Although this conflict of interests tends to 
generate protest-prone situations, it nevertheless brings out new worlds of meaning. It 
grants communications a certain stance or disposition towards an expectation which 
supposes it will be disappointed (A anticipates B will reject X, so A proposes Y). It 
allows communications to then decide in advance on a response whereby, however 
events actually turn out, it is the expectation of how the other reacts, rather than the 
event itself, which serves as the reference point for one’s next anticipated claim or 
 
19   ‘Factory time’ in the sense that it is the power company which decides, based on the electricity 
demand, the amount of water and at which time water is to be let through the turbines or sluice gates (see 
Jakobsson 2002, p. 44). 
20   More specifically, this being the law’s burden of having to present the high probability of conflicting 
legal claims, as if there were a high probability that the limits of normality have been already 
predetermined by law. 
  
 
counter claim. It therefore offers communications more suitable forms of conflict 
topics and reasons as opposed to the open use of violence, which among other negative 
consequences, interrupts communication necessary for the self-reproduction of 
society (Luhmann 1995, p. 369). Indeed, if this peculiar form of determinate 
contradiction is true, then this is why one speaks of the need for a shared understanding 
to resolve the condition of absolute uncertainty.
21 
One which perhaps the law is best 
placed to offer ‘damage limitation’ services (Fischer-Lescano and Teubner 2004, 
p. 1045), as will be explored next. 
 
Paradox 
 
When paradoxes are generated by very specific social systems,
22 
they are inevitably 
re-produced, albeit in a different form within the law. But what differentiates societal 
paradoxes from legal paradoxes is that the latter has greater additional freedom 
because it cannot alter the symbol of the validity of law (Luhmann 2004, p. 305, 326). 
Instead, one has to conduct claims by open reference to rules and principles instead of 
in secret and without adequate documentation; by aiming towards coherence and 
consistency, instead of a selective bargaining between ‘old boys’; or by an openness to 
revision in light of new information and accountability for choices made, instead of 
counting on getting away with it (Koskenniemi 1996, p. 455, 478). Viewed in this way, 
the law’s normative aspirations serve to subject communications to highly selective 
actualisations of the future and, thus, at the same time suppress irrelevant 
communications that are counter conducive to the law’s own self-perpetuation.23 
The protest movement in the context of the planned Myanmar Myitsone 
Hydropower project exemplifies the point. The protest movement introduces the 
probe of inequality into the planning system and measures the evident inequalities. It 
then generates re-distribution topics calling for the halting of the planned project, so as 
to re-allocate water resources for the local villages, and thus less for industry and 
urban dwellers. But the protest movement can hardly be stylised as a struggle for the 
law, since the context of the planned project takes place not by unregulated seizure, 
but via property and contract; that is to say in conformity with the agreed law between 
the China Power Investment Corporation, and the Myanmese Government (see Ruo 
2011). Viewed from the perspective of decision makers, failure to restore adequate 
legal redundancies
24 
and counter such activism is therefore imperative, as this would 
lead to an element of immense uncertainty. It would grant the possibilities actualised 
 
 
21   Absolute uncertainty in the sense that any further action of subject A is blocked, because A has 
nothing to follow up or to relate to the past histories, current actions or future expectations of its object of 
study, subject B. 
22   For example, see above in footnote 9. 
23   In a previous paper entitled ‘Making paradoxes invisible: International law as an autopoietic system’, I 
have reconceptualised from a Luhmannian perspective how international law self-perpetuates itself as an 
autopoietic system, and how the system proceeds to make paradoxes invisible (forthcoming). 
24   For example, this could be the restoration of so-called ‘stabilisation’ or ‘umbrella’ clauses which seek 
to protect the commitment that was made to the foreign investor at the time of signing a contract with the 
relevant parties. See e.g. Rieu-Clarke (2015). 
  
 
by the protest movement to become the possibilities for another movement; it would 
open up the law to the floodgates of litigation and deprive both the internal 
development of law and the functional development of the economy, of its desires for 
consistency and predictability; in short, it would obstruct not only all efforts to base 
decisions on rational calculation but, in the last instance, also undermine the claim of 
method and procedure to rationality. 
Deploying legal argumentation through the mediums of contract and property on 
the other hand can be seen as a defence against this. This is because it allows 
possibilities to retain a concreteness. The decision makers of A can learn from the 
experiences of B without A being in the situation to actualise these experiences as its 
own. The decision makers of A thus gain an immense increase in direct selectivity of 
awareness, such as the possibility for a state to transfer ownership over water property 
rights, by entering into a concession contract with a private company. This has the 
advantage of ‘opening up economic possibilities in the domain of rational calculation 
that had hitherto been inaccessible’ (Luhmann 1993, p. 65). At the same time, retaining 
this concreteness allows the law to observe itself as if it were ‘moving forward in a 
seemingly purposeful way’ (King and Thornhill 2003, p. 50). The task of the political 
system might be to fix amounts such as the level of acceptable environmental 
pollution, or the final amount of fresh water consumption acceptable to the public. The 
task of the economic systems might be then to provide the optimal distribution and 
usage of these amounts. And the task of the law might be to refine, regulate and 
continue these operations in one direction (and not the other) towards the desired goals. 
Nonetheless, retaining structural concreteness in possibilities between systems 
also  comes  at  the  price  of  increasing  the  potentiality  of  risks  and,  hence, 
unreliability within society. The experiences of B may be incompatible for others, 
and thus B’s intentions could become A’s disappointment. This is exemplified if one 
views the paradox of scarcity as a social problem, whereby the elimination of scarcity 
for B through a dam’s redistribution of water actually increases scarcity for A. Of 
course, in order to prevent catastrophic strains and breaks in public and private 
finance, market systems frequently disguise and distort this paradox by employing 
instead political and economic success stories such as the semantics of 
‘environmental sustainable growth’, something to which law plays its part in 
concealing. In particular, the success stories of benefits from the river, benefits 
because of the river, and benefits that extend beyond the river (Sadoff and Grey 
2002) are used, for example, to accomplish this social construction. 
It is here, however, that the problem arises. This is because when newly acquired 
knowledge is deployed to establish the difference between availability decisions 
(i.e. the anticipated availability of water resources), and allocation decisions (i.e. the 
anticipated benefits derived from the river for agriculture, domestic or energy 
purposes etc.), such differences tend to get tangled up in a kind of ‘strange loop’ 
(Hofstadter 2007). For when one intends to operate on one level, this unexpectedly 
becomes the operations of another. As exemplified when allocation decisions 
interfere with availability decisions which then create compelling grounds for 
changing the pretext of availability due to the demands of allocation. Of course, this 
is not necessarily a bad thing, since it is indeed part of the decision-making process 
which  allows  planning  systems  to  continue  their  autopoiesis  and  re-adapt  to 
  
 
changing environments. But what this ‘strange loop’ of tangled decision making 
does give rise to is the generation of perhaps another more relentless paradox: that 
the more law intervenes by legitimising the demands for water allocation,
25   
the 
more unpredictability is introduced because the more likely unintended side-effects 
such as unanticipated droughts or floods become locatable and attributable to a 
decision and, thus, the more society grows to distrust hydropower technology. 
 
Indeterminacy 
 
When it appears to systems that the powers of laws, policies and plans have broken 
their promises to create a better world, cynicism inevitably emerges. This happens 
predominately because the structures of ecological risks do not follow the logic of 
cooperation but rather, so to speak, ambush cooperation by straining the doctrine of 
concerted action. In the context of hydropower infrastructure developments, the 
unintended consequence of river-bed incision and the resulting problem chains
26 
occurring geographically elsewhere, exemplifies the point. Of course, no matter what 
actually happens, the event will happen many times depending on a system’s scope 
of analysis. What might be understood as ‘politically convenient and acceptable 
solutions’ to ecological dangers for one system, may lead to functional disturbances 
in other systems (Luhmann 1989, p. 120). What might be established as the 
distinctions between legal and illegal within the planning system, may lead to an 
attribution of injustice by others, and thus trigger the communications of protest. 
If it is true that the time spans of reliable experiences and expectations in modern 
society are dramatically decreasing (Luhmann 1976), then this means that imposing 
structural constraints upon a planning system’s available possibilities becomes ever 
more prevalent.
27  
However, operationalising this structural constraint can no longer 
rely solely on the norm-orientated institutions and methods derived from state- 
oriented legal management.
28  
On the contrary, the problem shifts more into the 
question of how to absorb external connections newly made between legal and non- 
legal discourses. Indeed, this preference to sensitise the law towards the rationalities 
of, namely, science, economics and technology,
29   
is of course nothing but the 
 
25   As  exemplified in  most treaty  agreements, whereby the  law  is  often based on  a  fiction which 
aggregates water availability as a given. 
26   Such as when a hydropower dam releases large amounts of water in powerful surges so as to provide 
electricity during the day, resulting in the problem chain of riverbed scouring, and the loss of organic 
materials, sediment, vegetation and macroinvertebrates. 
27   This is because by imposing structural constraints upon planning systems, this enhances their overall 
stability, and thus paradoxically grants them greater freedom to continue their operations. 
28   This is because according to Zumbansen, these institutions have actually ceased to be the ‘risk 
carriers’ of societal evolution (2001). 
29   It should be noted that technology systems such as hydropower infrastructure are not autopoietic, since 
they do not perform either biotic or metabiotic autopoietic operations. Thus, this is why system theorists 
speak of the inability of technology systems to directly cause social change. Nonetheless, technology 
systems do participate in the social construction of reality by creating the conditions for social systems to 
change themselves (see, for instance, ‘Self-Reference’ section). In this sense, technology systems only 
‘feign the status of autopoietic systems’ (Clarke 2014, p. 15) because, although they partake in the 
autopoiesis of social systems, they do not themselves produce autopoietic operations. 
  
 
acknowledgement that cognitive-orientated functional systems
30  
have increasing 
priority. 
Nevertheless, these functional systems cannot constitute themselves as unities 
capable of action. A scientific publication which forms part of the scientific system 
cannot, after all, communicate with a corporation’s financial statement which forms 
part of the economic system. This is why organisations are crucial, since only they can 
communicate with other organised social spheres (e.g. a university communicating 
with a corporate company). Yet in order for organisations to acquire societal relevance 
they must also have a functional echo (Mathias and Hilkermeier 2004, p. 192). An 
investment bank analysing the cost-benefit risk of investing in hydropower 
infrastructure exemplifies the point. On the one hand, in order for the bank to ensure 
its performativity and reap the predictable benefits from complying with the demands 
of functional systems, it must remain a product of them, and that means to be 
multilingual. It must therefore not limit itself to economic communications but must 
also conform itself to legal procedures, including the mechanisms of cooperative soft 
laws directly coupled
31  
with the operative constraints of functional systems. These 
constraints may be, for instance, scientific or public health observations which 
irritate
32  
planning practices by making their complexity (and with it indeterminacy, 
contingency and the pressure to select) available for the legal system to construct as 
soft law. The point in case being the World Commission Dam’s good governance 
standards, a theme I shall return to later. 
On the other hand, organisations are also the producers of communications, since 
they can make decisions about whatever they want. Investment banks can, for 
example, decide to treat the risks involved in displacement from hydropower 
developments correctly or incorrectly; in the case of the latter, for example, due to the 
dynamics of functional differentiation, this would result more in neglect than 
exploitation or suppression.
33  
Indeed, the investment bank may seek to give the 
impression of compliance with the constraints imposed by functional differentiation, 
but the bank can nevertheless in their practices, via informal organised measurements, 
non-decisions and others, decide not to act on such issues. Due to the successful 
‘invisibilisation of social inequalities’ as promised by functional differentiation 
(Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos and Webb 2015), such decisions may not produce 
noise.
34   
Yet if this promise is broken, then the original communications of the 
 
 
30   In the sense that these functional systems are geared towards permanent innovation as opposed to 
norm-oriented functional systems such as law and politics, which tend to rely upon finding consensus (see 
Kerwer 2004, pp. 201–202). 
31   Coupling in the sense that systems refer to each other and ‘existentially’ depend on each other but at 
the same time operate autonomously by remaining an environment to each other. 
32   Irritation is understood here not as annoyance, but rather as an itching calling for action. 
33   This is because, according to Luhmann, exploitation and suppression are forms of violence more 
reminiscent of stratified societies where there is a clear dual distinction between the aristocracy and 
common people (1997, p. 74). As exemplified when the US Agency for International Development 
funded the redesign for steeply sloped concrete sides on the Mahaweli irrigation project in Sri Lanka, 
making it as a result impossible for the indigenous local population to continue their customary uses such 
as bathing, laundry or the watering of domestic animals (Groenfeldt 2013, p. 136). 
34   As the well-known proverb states ‘pas d’inte´reˆt, pas d’action’ (no interest, no action). 
  
 
investment bank may produce follow-on communications, and thus become part of the 
self-reproduction of protest communications; in particular, advocacy organisations. 
The existence of advocacy organisations is, however, a precarious one. If one 
views their radicalisation not as a ‘condition of emergence’ but as a condition ‘of 
continuation’ (Luhmann 1995, p. 401), system-environment theoretical insight can 
offer roughly two modes of self-reproduction. On the one hand, they may become 
lost in pure self-referentiality. In order to survive, advocacy organisations must 
presuppose another side against which they can protest, and therefore cannot 
themselves be or become this other side. For example, the International Rivers 
advocacy organisation initiated the ‘Stop Dam Greenwashing’ campaign, discred- 
iting the dam-building industries’ efforts of justifying development on the general 
discourse of greenhouse gas reduction, climate change mitigation and clean energy 
(Imhof and Lanza 2010). The result, however, was that in order for such advocacy 
organisations to enter the list of ‘defenders of nature’,35  they must therefore resist 
collaboration with the industry so as to avoid being accused of ‘supping’ with the 
devil (Wilson 2002). But such advocacy organisations cannot survive on this 
oppositional difference alone. They must also radicalise demands, heighten 
sensibilities, and attempt to attain a position that offers only limited room for 
consensus. They must not only discredit existing ‘unsustainable’ practices in the 
hydropower industry, but must also scrutinise the very raison d’eˆtre to build dams— 
‘infrastructure for who’? (International Rivers 2012). They must leap from topic to 
topic so as to generate new protest issues from ‘new topics when old ones have run 
their course’ (Luhmann 1993, pp. 136–137). The alternative would after all see their 
dispersion, and the general left-behind residuum of protest from which, given more 
favourable opportunities, new movements might form, with other topics structurally 
biased towards assuring the continued existence of other social systems. 
On the other hand, advocacy organisations may become absorbed by their 
environments. This is because when issues are incorporated into conventional 
politics, they no longer trigger protest communications, but rather contribute to the 
construction of a particular societal reality. For example, when the (advocacy) 
organisation World Wildlife Fund (WWF) employ the symbolism of alternative 
hydropower sustainability norms and practices, these values and vocabularies are 
also shared by the industries which they criticise.
36  
Consequently, any diagnosis of 
societal problems and suggestions for remedial strategies can hardly be said to 
challenge the leading self-descriptions
37 
employed by the industry, but rather it will 
tend to legitimise their actions and thus assist them in their claim for credibility. In 
other  words,  it  will  grant  the  industry  an  apology  so  that  they  can  ‘market 
 
35   Incidentally, in order to enter this list, advocacy organisations must also downplay the risk involved in 
refusing to develop hydropower infrastructure, such as the risk of flooding, lack of sufficient energy, or 
economic decline. 
36   As supported by Eichert who, drawing upon empirical research, observes that there is a collaborative 
and consensus-oriented approach established between WWF and the hydropower sustainability assessment 
forum (2014, pp. 193–197). 
37  Self-description, meaning here the established difference between the industries’ own particular routines, 
repetitive communications or past decisions, and their environments (namely all other systemic 
communications). 
  
 
themselves on the basis of such euphemistic semantics’ (Moeller 2005, p. 117), and 
thus assist them to do what they would have probably done anyway. Of course, such 
(advocacy) organisations must never admit their self-foundational paradox, that they 
must present themselves as adopting an external neutral point of view, despite the 
fact that their communications will always remain a system within a functionally 
differentiated society. As exemplified when the WWF organisation speaks the 
language of neutrality—dams are ‘both a blessing and a curse’ (WWF 2004, p. 3)— 
but at the same time couples itself with the operative demands of the economic system 
whereby voluntary standards promoting efficiency are prioritised over binding 
standards promoting legal stability.
38  
What one finds as a consequence is that the 
industries’ adoption of sustainability norms and practices will therefore tend to 
produce only a limited equalising effect, for what actually is empowered is more or 
less a bold propagation of concrete economic interests. 
Viewed in this way, the more influential an advocacy organisation is as a 
regulatory agent, the more it must be satisfied with compromises, and therefore the 
less revolutionary its policies can be. Whereas the more revolutionary an advocacy 
organisation is, the more difficult it will be to occupy those administrative positions 
in which the main lines of policy are being set. Either way, there is no guarantee that 
either movement knows more about the problems of modern society, ‘or judge them 
more accurately than any other system of society’ (Luhmann 1998, p. 865). The 
only guarantee is that when a conflict of interest does arise as a conflict of legally 
accepted interests (such as over the law of restitution), they are inevitably reproduced 
not just between two opposing groups, amongst whom the law is then divided; 
instead, they are made up of an opposition between two representations of law, two 
incompatible conceptions of right and wrong, of which neither can be reconciled 
within the concrete case at issue. Nevertheless, this does not imply that one has to 
lose heart and surrender to an ‘anything goes’ (Luhmann 2000, p. 131). The question 
is only how might society depend on the support offered by the law’s institutional 
norms (eigenvalues), and how might this support enhance the overall stability within 
society. 
 
Stability  Through  Eigenvalues 
 
Eigenvalues offer systems stability. For the law, legal eigenvalues are neither 
desirable normative end points, nor do they offer guarantees against societal risks and  
dangers. Rather, they  symbolise various institutional  norms and  principles which 
the law proclaims as legally valid, and thus indisputable. In doing so, this self-
validated unity (i.e. realness of legality) enables the law to perform its function within 
society, which is to take measures against conflict formations. The six institutional 
norms which Rieu-Clarke proposes in the context of transboundary hydropower 
infrastructure development exemplifies this, for what they enable is for planning  
systems  to  communicate  that  particular  ‘legitimate’  goals  have  been 
 
 
38   As supported by Eichert who suggests that WWF’s rationale for backing an initial ‘voluntary approach 
to sustainable industry performance’ was due to the ‘belief that the dam industry is not ready to adopt or 
accept any binding standards’ (Eichert 2014, p. 194). 
  
 
implemented to address particular problems which have been identified. If, for 
instance, ‘the obligation to prevent transboundary harm’, to conduct a ‘Trans- 
boundary Environmental Impact Assessment’, to conduct ‘stakeholder consulta- 
tions’, to ensure ‘equity and the right to water’, to balance between ‘environmental 
protection’ and ‘investor protection’, to implement ‘institutional co-ordination’ 
(Rieu-Clarke 2015) are all enforced by law, then in principle this enables planning 
systems to legitimise all of the side effects of their actions. Of course, whether other 
systems can tolerate these side effects will remain an open question; something to 
which law aids by deploying its greatest weapon of epistemological distance—‘the 
subterfuge of abstraction’ (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos 2013, p. 22, 27). 
Therein lies the pragmatic value of legal eigenvalues. They offer planning systems 
stability precisely because they are vague and underdetermining. They secure their 
status as legally binding principles with society-wide validity, precisely because their 
vagueness allows recipients to make something out of them according to one’s own 
particular priorities. As a result, this increases the likelihood that conflicting claims 
therewith can start to look like interactions, and eventually might even be seen as 
intended, consensus-oriented communications. Furthermore, once this occurs, one 
then tends to bind oneself before knowing whether others will agree, thus clarifying 
presumable obligations even if the specific planning content remains undecided. The 
legal requirement that all states must conduct a transboundary environmental impact 
assessment exemplifies this point. Everyone agrees on its necessity but, with regards to 
actual content, it is to the discretion of states to decide.
39  
Undeniably such style of 
declaratory politics leaves much to be desired. Yet what is attained from the law’s 
strategy of ‘sounding out’ the capacity for consensus is that it is an operation which can 
always be carried further (Luhmann 1995, p. 233). It nurtures a type of situational 
dependency, whereby specialised expert systems can offer more measured margins of 
security for diagnosing the possibility of risk itself and thus bring many more 
possibilities into the discussion, which paradoxically means making the future even 
more unpredictable (Ciampi 2013, p. 251). 
Of course, it is not always necessary ‘to risk the glance into paradoxicality’ 
(Luhmann 1990b, p. 133, 137). This being in particular the problem of over- complex 
planning systems, whereby too many cogs end up hampering the system and each 
cog becoming less visible (Luhmann 1990a). Instead, it is sufficient to create a 
politics of time, whereby the pace and mobility of world markets and other functional 
processes are slowed down to the rhythm of political decision-making (Jessop 2012, 
p. 212). Take for example downstream state A, whose national policy goals are for 
the development of enhanced flood control and electricity supply so as support its 
burgeoning economy. After various risk assessments state A concludes that the 
optimum location to build the hydropower dam is not within its own territorial 
jurisdiction, but rather within the territory of upstream state B. To enable 
 
39   As exemplified in the Pulp Mills Case between Argentina and Uruguay, whereby the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) suggested that general international law imposes a requirement upon states to 
conduct a transboundary environmental impact assessment, but it is ‘for each state to determine in its 
domestic legislation or in the authorization process for the project, the specific content of the 
environmental impact assessment required in each case’ (see International Court of Justice 2010, para, 
205). 
  
 
these plans state A offers ‘side-payments’ (Dinar 2006) to state B so as to compensate 
it for the collateral effects incurred for building the hydropower project upstream. Due 
to their histories of acceptance (i.e. developers arguing for example not against the 
plan itself, but against the features of this or that plan), a treaty is therefore agreed 
between them, and thus ‘islands of predictability’, or ‘guideposts of reliability’ are 
created (Arendt 1958, p. 244). 
In the rear-view mirror of a planning system’s historical hindsight, such agreement 
may look curiously like progress.
40 
For what it exemplifies is how, on the one hand, the 
law facilitates the transformation of political problems into a problem about costs. This 
is because side-payments here perform the task of motivating the acceptance of 
propositions and, thus, dramatically increasing the capacity for states to express 
preferences. On the other hand, such agreement also exemplifies how responsibility is 
redistributed, because what it recognises is that both states are now jointly responsible 
for the development. Of course, negotiating treaties with side-payment provisions may 
‘ratchet up’ new problems (Barret 2003, p. 357), such as the administration of 
disappointments. This is typically the case if downstream state A becomes more and 
more reliant upon the services of upstream state B not only to construct but also 
eventually regulate the operations of the hydropower dam. For what this means is that 
state B now acquires the possibility to extract even larger side-payments from state A, 
by using the threat to withdraw its services as a means to coerce state A to do what state 
B wants, and thus impose a ‘victim pays’ regime (Dinar 2006, p. 419). It is the 
anticipation of these circumstances that explains why some downstream states tend to 
resist joint-development hydropower projects with their riparian upstream neigh- 
bours, as exemplified in the Euphrates River with Turkey, Syria and Iraq.
41
 
Nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean the realpolitik of sovereign states 
will always prevail. Where bilateral agreements between states fail to institutionalise 
conflicts,
42 
specific organisational systems, such as joint management mechanisms, 
tend to fulfil this role. What is interesting here is that the tensions within these 
organisations will routinely emerge from the conflicting requirements of different 
functional systems. As evident when decision makers are frequently confronted with 
the choice of pursuing either the path advocated by the International Commission on 
Large Dams (ICOLD) and its close couplings with the economic system, or the World 
Commission on Dams (WCD) governance standards and its close couplings with the 
system of science.
43   
Inevitably such generation of soft law norms will 
 
40   For example, this is exemplified in the 1961 Columbia River Treaty between the US and Canada 
which is often cited as a ‘success’ story in terms of transboundary flood control and hydrogeneration 
cooperation. See e.g. Firuz (2012, p. 191). 
41   As observed by Zeitoun et al. who points out that ‘(w)ith no basin-wide management occurring’, the 
Euphrates River has seen ‘independent development’, with the result that ‘each riparian state is aimed at 
maximum economic benefit—and generating considerable ecological and social impacts’ (Zeitoun et al. 
2013, p. 336). 
42   This is because after long diplomatic negotiations, treaty agreements often have barely any substance 
left. As supported by the empirical observation whereby two thirds of the world’s 263 international river 
basins, plus transboundary aquifer systems, lack any type of cooperative management framework (UN- 
Water 2008). 
43   As suggested by Scheumann, who observes that the WCD good governance standards made public in 
2000, confronted with the ICOLD standards because of its anti-developmental stance (2008, p. 62). 
  
 
radically widen the structural disposition of hydropower regulation from that of a 
mere interstate dispute to that of a collision between the rationalities of namely 
limitationality in science, and efficiency in economics. Yet this clash of rationalities, 
this ‘social space of instability and constant confrontation’ (Priba´n˜ 2001), promoted 
to an extent by law’s absurdly simplified legal rules—constraint of rule-making—is 
not necessarily a functional error. 
On the contrary, it is the very space where ‘legitimisation’ takes place (2001). It 
is the very space where systems ‘transcends geopolitical boundaries’44  and hence, 
‘like customary international law, fills the global plenum’ (D’Amato 2009, p. 898). 
Above all, it is the very space where systems learn to organise themselves, understand 
themselves, and indeed withdraw their inherent centrifugal tendencies
45 
so as to 
maintain compatibility with their given environments. To facilitate these processes 
it may therefore be necessary for the law to remain content with the eigenvalues of: 
tacit consensus, so as to make it seem that no problem exists at all (and thus avoid 
the dilemma of absolute uncertainty); procedure, so as to make it possible to refuse 
substantive solutions; and equity, so as to make it possible to break through the 
legal autopoiesis of regimes involved in collisions, and replace their transcending 
ideals of universality and univocality with instead the ‘emergency imaginaries’46  of 
diversity and ambiguity. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
One might feel disappointed with the apparent emptiness of this theoretical 
framework. Indeed, its self-imposed restraints regarding whether certain blueprints 
for action produce morally good or morally bad results, or whether they result in 
progress or regression, might well seem rather anti-climactic and radically incomplete 
for those seeking answers to social problems. Its abysmal failure to offer any sort 
of direct guidance on where solutions to global problems might be found provokes 
the very reasonable question: so what then is the value of this framework? I propose 
that the value of a Luhmannian-inspired theoretical framework lies in its ability to 
enlighten society, not by slumbering over the potentialities of rationality and its 
traditional optimistic ways of thought,
47  
but by bringing to our attention the limits 
of rationality in a society of function systems. In this sense, the claims of this 
framework are very modest, for it cannot advise states 
 
 
44   In the sense that communications do not respect borders. 
45   Centrifugal tendencies, in the sense that every system desires to expand and encompass as much of its 
environment (and thus other social systems) as possible. For example, consider when scientific data is 
forced continuously to communicate politically and not scientifically, with the result that it becomes 
unlikely for science to be able to continue its autopoiesis. 
46   More specifically, this being the way in which the emergency imaginary of the future ‘invites law to 
speculate about deeds not yet committed, to undo its forms of defuturization and to derogate its 
fundamental guarantees’ (Opitz and Tellmann 2014, p. 17). 
47   This being, for example, what Allmendinger describes as rationalist models of planning which are 
driven by the assumption of a guidance centre capable of implementing pre-established goals through 
purposeful planning and ‘social engineering’ (2002). 
  
 
or actors on whether or not their practices for developing hydropower infrastructure 
are on the right track. But what it can do, however, is make observations which can 
enable them to better understand where they are, why the oppositional claims are 
presumptuous and, above all, to offer a more controlled means for creating ideas by 
resisting the temptation to get carried away with politically informed excitement, 
such as when a treaty professes to incorporate the inter-connectedness of 
ecohydrologic units.
48
 
The  four  elements  of  self-reference,  paradox,  indeterminacy  and  stability 
through eigenvalues are proposed to exemplify these methodological tools. 
Beginning with self-reference, the analysis here explores how the law is forced to 
stabilise and manage paradoxes, despite the fact that the law itself does not possess 
at its disposal much power or influence. Indeed, the law can only ever offer damage 
limitation services since it has ‘(n)o arbitrariness of the power sovereign, no generous 
distribution of monetary resources, no precise prediction of future events, no dark 
oracle, no mystic revelation’ (Teubner 2009, p. 21). Instead, law’s operations always 
end up joining the traditions of environmental parlances drawn between the 
industrialist, and the supporters of ecological interests. 
This is exemplified in paradox. The analysis here explores how the law not only 
attempts  to  resolve  conflicts but  also  anticipates  and  even  promotes  them.  It 
attempts to resolve conflicts by countering activism through the restoration of legal 
argumentative redundancies. It imagines as completed in the future the consequen- 
tial actions of failed restored redundancies, and uses this selective legal 
reconstruction to further reinforce legal redundancies. It therefore has the potential 
to promote conflict, because as long as the law keeps some residual authority to 
intervene in social disputes the question will always be: to what extent has this 
intervention been used consistently and in a sensitive fashion? 
Thus, with the infinite return of paradox, indeterminacy arises. The analysis here 
explores why legal development should not be understood as progress solely in the 
sense of an increasingly better realisation of rationalities derived from state practices. 
Nor should it be seen as a steadily increasing eradication of deviant behaviour. On 
the contrary, legal development ought to be seen as the ability for law to 
simultaneously absorb structural changes newly made by the cognitive-orientated 
rationalities of namely science, economics and technology. This of course is not 
because the couplings between world politics and law have weakened. Rather, it is 
because the community of states is much narrower than the community of relevant 
actors and activities whose societal relevance remains largely dependent on the 
functional echoes of these cognate systems. However, the problem that arises when 
the law aligns itself with the mechanisms of cooperative soft laws directly coupled 
with the operative constraints of these systems is that the law begins to lose its 
 
 
48   This is not to say that implementing such a treaty is a futile attempt which should be given up. But 
what this text reminds us of is that this is an event in politics, and that it has first and foremost political 
effects—not environmental ones. As exemplified when the term ‘basin’ treaty was employed as the scope 
for environmental protection in the 1995 Mekong River Treaty, with the first and foremost effects being 
that political communications often translated this instead as a watercourse, which is a smaller spatial unit 
of jurisdiction than a basin (Sneddon and Fox 2006). 
  
 
normativity: it risks being swamped by their logics, leading to the potential corruption 
of the law’s systemic code. 
Therein lies the value of stability through eigenvalues. The analysis here explores 
how legal eigenvalues not only serve to regulate paradoxes, but also participate in 
societies’ construction of reality. On the one hand, they facilitate regulation by 
employing  institutional  norms  such  as  accountability,  joint-mechanisms, equitable 
utilisation and so forth. These operations serve the function of communicating within 
society that problems are recognised, and that only through a process of constant 
renegotiation, whereby conflict is postponed so as to replace the freezing effect of 
truth-seeking consensus with the pliability of the spaces of ignorance, can a ‘politics 
of understanding’ be found (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos 
2006, p. 141). On the other hand, legal eigenvalues also participate in societies’ 
construction of reality. Although such institutional norms may seem to ‘say nothing 
by saying too much’ (Holmes 2011, p. 127), they nevertheless productively 
fictionalise conflicts. They enable the failure of planning systems and their inherent 
‘co-evolution of unsustainability’49  to be recast into action and decisiveness. They 
enable planning systems then to maintain the impression of order, progress and 
controllability within a world where communications essentially have an innate 
tendency to generate the opposite of what was originally intended. Does this ‘self- 
illusioning symbolism’ (Luhmann 1998, p. 766), this presentation of the compas- 
sionate society, the good friendly neighbour, the optimistic slogans of win–win co- 
operation etc., create the recipe for social catastrophe? Not necessarily. If one accepts 
that it is better to pretend that planning systems are reliable and that success is 
possible, as opposed to the alternative of absolute uncertainty, then this presentation 
serves a useful purpose. It is so because it cushions planning systems from the 
structural risks which arise as a consequence of the irresolvability of paradoxes, and 
this is necessary as it enables planning systems to continue their unending  search  
for  new  knowledge,  new  doubts,  and  better  insights  when managing the 
paradoxes of hydropower regulation. For this reason, I submit, to make use of 
paradoxes is therefore not to relentlessly expose or pathetically avoid paradoxes but, 
rather, it requires a kind of ‘stoic’ attitude of staying on the job and doing the 
formulations (Luhmann 1982, p. 137), while at the same time recognising 
paradoxically that the most ingenious way of becoming foolish is by a system. 
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49   For example, once a dam is built and its reservoir is formed, the region that is served will be 
developed. In other words, it will be filled with cities, roads, car parks and houses. However, this urban 
development lowers the water table due to water extraction and urban runoff and, consequently, it will 
lower the river level even further. Eventually, such growth imperative spurred on by developers and 
politicians will mean that the new human populace will at some point in time run out of water. By then, 
the new human populace may even demand another dam. Using this example, it becomes evident why 
Luhmann speaks quite correctly of the ‘co-evolution of unsustainability’, as opposed to the sustainable 
co-evolution of social systems (1998, pp. 568–569). 
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